Ireland’s Courts: “We Don’t Love Litigation Funding… But We Don’t Hate It Either”
Maintenance and Champerty in Irish Law
For centuries, Irish law has restricted third-party litigation funding through the rules against maintenance and champerty. Broadly speaking, these rules prevent people with no genuine connection to a dispute from funding litigation, particularly where they stand to profit from the outcome.
Recent Irish Court Decisions
The rules against maintenance and champerty were established by the Maintenance and Embracery Act 1634. Broadly speaking, these principles prevent outsiders with no legitimate interest in a dispute from funding litigation.
Maintenance occurs where someone with no legitimate connection to a case supports or funds it. Champerty is a particular form of maintenance where the funder receives a share of any award or settlement if the case succeeds. Recent decisions suggest that the courts are increasingly willing to examine the purpose behind a funding arrangement rather than simply applying the rules against maintenance and champerty in a rigid fashion. While the prohibition reaffirmed by Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v Minister for Public Enterprise [2017] IESC 27 remain firmly embedded in Irish law, the Courts appear far more willing to recognise competing public policy concerns.
In the recent Campbell v O’Doherty [2025] IEHC 223, the defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s use of a GoFundMe campaign to help fund the litigation amounted to unlawful maintenance and champerty. The High Court rejected that argument. The Court accepted that the donations made in this case, were made for genuine charitable reasons. The donors had no financial interest in the outcome of the case. The decision suggests that crowdfunding will not automatically breach the rules on maintenance and champerty where supporters are motivated by sympathy or charitable objectives rather than the prospect of financial gain.
In Scully v Coucal [2025] IESC 20, Irish investors transferred their claims to a company which successfully sued in Poland. When that Polish judgment was later brought to Ireland for enforcement, it was argued that the original arrangements offended Irish rules on maintenance and champerty. The judgment demonstrates that the courts may be reluctant to invoke maintenance and champerty where doing so would undermine important competing public policy considerations, such as the mutual recognition of judgments within the European Union.
In the matter of Joseph Howley and Paul Howard and the Attorney General and Law Society of Ireland [2026] IESC 34, the Supreme Court considered whether fee arrangements used by the Revenue Commissioners’ panel solicitors, including “no foal, no fee” provisions and success-related fee uplifts, breached the rules against champerty.
The Court concluded that the arrangements were lawful. Hogan J noted that similar arrangements are widespread throughout the legal system, particularly in personal injuries, clinical negligence and judicial review proceedings. Significantly, the judgment emphasised that the law on maintenance and champerty must be applied in a manner consistent with the constitutional right of access to the courts.
What These Decisions Mean for Businesses and Litigants
It would be premature to suggest that Ireland is moving towards a more liberal funding regime similar to the regimes in England and Wales. However, recent decisions indicate that the courts are increasingly willing to balance the traditional concerns underlying maintenance and champerty against competing public interests such as: Access to justice, effective enforcement of claims and the practical realities of modern litigation. Businesses and individuals considering alternative funding structures should continue to proceed with caution, but these decisions could indicate a move to a more pragmatic judicial approach.
This potential shift in perspective may be particularly significant for parties involved in complex or high-value litigation where legal costs present a substantial obstacle to pursuing a claim. Charitable crowdfunding, collective actions, insolvency-related claims and innovative fee structures may all receive a more nuanced analysis from the courts than might previously have been expected. While caution remains necessary when considering any third-party funding arrangement, the recent cases suggest that the courts are becoming increasingly concerned with the substance and purpose of an arrangement rather than its form alone.
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